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549 
Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent 
Small Claims Court? 
Robert P. Greenspoon* 
In the past few years, legislative proposals for United States 
patent reform have centered on changing the Patent Act.1 Some 
commentators have questioned patent reform, asking whether such 
proposals favor large interests at the expense of individuals and small 
businesses.2 Overlooked since 1992 in discussions about patent 
reform is an obscure proposal that ought to help individuals, small 
businesses, large businesses, consumers, and the court system 
itself—a Patent Small Claims Court. 
In the early 1990s, several important policy groups, including the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), voiced support for such a court, 
but, ultimately, no one took up the cause.3 At the time, these policy 
groups expressed concerns that transaction costs for patent 
enforcement under the current U.S. system are prohibitively high for 
a significant subset of inventors—namely, those who stand to recover 
only small sums from any given infringer.4 
In this article, I re-propose (with improvements) a Patent Small 
Claims Court for the United States. Time has shown that such a court 
will credibly address a major failure in the current patent system—its 
                                                          
© 2009 Robert P. Greenspoon. 
* Member, Flachsbart & Greenspoon, LLC. I thank William W. Flachsbart, 
Michael R. La Porte, and Jennifer F. Yorke for their ideas and assistance. I 
especially thank the Honorable Brian Barnett Duff (U.S. Senior District 
Judge, retired) for his thoughtful input. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
views and opinions in this article are my own, and should not be 
attributed to any of the people I named above, or to any of my clients. 
1 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent Reform 
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009). 
2 See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Another Horse in the Race, 15 INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY 22, 22 (2008) (sarcastically renaming the lobbying group 
“Coalition for Patent Fairness” as the “Coalition for Fairness to Foxes in 
the Henhouse”). 
3 See discussion infra Part II. 
4 Id. 
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inability to guarantee economical patent enforcement to all deserving 
patentees. Statistics from AIPLA confirm that transaction costs in the 
current system can be prohibitive.5 Meanwhile, other countries have 
shown that such a court can work. For example, England and Wales 
established a successful patent small claims court in 1990.6 In the 
United States, a Patent Small Claims Court would be advantageous to 
individuals and small businesses, to large interests with small 
disputes, and to large interests seeking systemic change to ensure the 
current court system is used only for cases that ought to be there. 
After introducing the general concept and rationale for a Patent 
Small Claims Court in the next section, I then discuss notable 
interest shown by the ABA and other bodies to similar proposals in 
the early 1990s. Next, I discuss the success of the Patents County 
Court in England and Wales. Finally, I propose a workable 
mechanism for implementing a Patent Small Claims Court system in 
the United States. I suggest local rules to add a patent small claims 
division in one or more district courts on an experimental basis.  If 
that experiment succeeds, congressional action might implement it 
nationwide. 
I. A SMALL CLAIMS COURT TO BRING EFFECTIVE 
PATENT REFORM 
For a significant subset of aggrieved innovators, the patent 
system has failed. While our federal court system has exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters relating to patent enforcement, it lacks 
particular rules or practices to make small-scale patent enforcement 
rational and effective. According to statistics reported in AIPLA’s 2007 
Report of the Economic Survey, patent cases in the least-expensive 
quartile nevertheless cost an average of $380,000 in fees and 
expenses to get through trial and appeal, where less than one million 
dollars in damages is at issue.7 Those same statistics show, mind-
bogglingly, that patent cases at the most expensive quartile cost an 
average of one million dollars in fees and expenses, even where the 
potential recovery is less than one million dollars.8 
The deterrent effect of these high costs to enforcing small-scale 
patent rights is self-evident. To seek a litigated resolution in the 
                                                          
5 See infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
6 See discussion infra Part III. 
7 LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-90 (2007) [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT OF 
ECONOMIC SURVEY].  
8 Id. 
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current environment of fees and expenses, where less than one 
million dollars is at stake, a rights holder must risk taking an action 
that might very well cost more than the potential recovery. The 
situation seems even bleaker when realizing that these expenses only 
buy access to the courts. Once there, even the best case has (as the 
saying goes) an eighty percent chance of success.9 While there are 
potential findings of willfulness, which might enhance damages by 
three times under section 284 of the Patent Act,10 or of an exceptional 
case, where the court may refund attorney fees under section 285 of 
the Patent Act,11 such outlier scenarios do not usually factor into 
initial decisions over whether to begin an enforcement action.12 
A Patent Small Claims Court would fill this gap in our system. 
The small claims court should, first, be skilled enough to resolve 
cases correctly, and, second, be cost-effective. By implication, it 
should be fast and efficient. If there were a good, cheap, and fast way 
to bring a small claim to resolution, the patentee’s dilemma would be 
vastly reduced. 
A small claims court for patent disputes would help individuals, 
small businesses, large businesses, and the court system itself. In 
contrast to the present patent litigation environment, where 
individuals or small businesses often cannot economically enforce 
their intellectual property rights even when they are willfully infringed 
upon, such a court system would provide a new opportunity. 
Unblocking access to the courts for a deserving subset of patentees 
will have the salutary effect of encouraging innovation. Helping 
innovation, in turn, helps consumers.13 
The very option for a patentee to file in small claims court would 
motivate good faith pre-suit negotiations. That is, if it were no longer 
effective for an accused infringer to ignore, or delay resolution of, a 
                                                          
9 Cf. GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 587 
(7th ed. 2004) (describing how, in one context, the English legal system 
designates cases that have a very good chance of success as those that 
have an 80 percent or better chance of success). 
10 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
11 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
12 The possibility of contingency fee representation would not change 
the analysis: few contingency fee lawyers would sign onto a case knowing 
their best sweep-the-boards outcome will yield them something less than 
their hourly rate—even substantially less. 
13 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995) (“In the 
absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly 
exploit the efforts of innovators and investors without compensation. 
Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and 
erode incentives to invest, ultimately to the detriment of consumers.”). 
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small-scale notice of infringement, the accused infringer would be 
required to credit the merits of such a claim. That is not to say any 
weaknesses of a claim would or should go unheeded. Instead, as often 
practiced during negotiations of large-scale patent infringement 
settlements, those weaknesses would be factored into a rational 
analysis leading to a discounted royalty amount.14 If, however, the 
weaknesses in a patentee’s claim were indeed fatal, or if business 
exigencies require a vigorous defense, an accused infringer would 
retain the option to decline to change a design or decline to pay a 
royalty. The creation of an inexpensive small claims court system 
would thus be a positive development for every category of accused 
infringers of any size. It either motivates ex ante behavior that leads 
more predictably to lawsuit avoidance, or it diminishes the 
transaction costs of whatever lawsuits cannot be avoided. 
 Perhaps counterintuitively, the existence of such an enforcement 
forum would also reduce overall federal court burdens. First, the 
presence of a small claims court would encourage negotiated 
resolutions for good faith small-scale disputes. Reduction in 
enforcement transaction costs would make it more likely that parties 
to a small-scale patent dispute will try to resolve the dispute. 
According to some, lowering transaction costs spawns more 
litigation.15 But, “[p]rocedures that affect the risks of trial may also 
have the opposite effect” compared to what was intended.16 In 
particular, increasing the amount of unbiased predictive information 
available to the parties will tend to reduce the number of suits.17 A 
small claims court would do just that—provide a wealth of data on 
how similarly situated cases resolve—although one might expect a 
transitional period of increased litigation while parties test the new 
forum.18 Second, having a small claims court for patent disputes 
                                                          
14 John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What to do After MedImmune 
v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 364, 369 (2007). 
15 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 62 (1996) 
(“[A] procedure that lowers the cost of litigation—for example, a small-
claims court—will increase the volume of litigation and the number of 
trials (albeit cheaper, quicker trials).”). 
16 Id. at 61. 
17 Id. at 60–61. 
18 See id. at 51 (“If trials became vanishingly rare, lawyers and 
litigants would make increasingly crude predictions of trial verdicts. As a 
result, there would be more cases in which their ill-informed guesses 
would be too far apart to compromise; which would lead to more trials, 
more verdicts, and better information on trial outcomes; which, in turn, 
would produce more settlements, and reduce or stabilize the trial rate.”). 
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would operate as a release valve, removing significant burdens from 
the current court system. According to statistics in the 2007 AIPLA 
survey, twenty-eight percent of reported patent cases (341 out of 
1206) involved less than one million dollars at issue.19 Setting the 
“small” threshold at this level has the potential to eliminate about 
one-third of all patent cases from the regular federal court docket. 
Large entities would also benefit. Even large entities experience 
small-scale infringement problems, and these, too, could be resolved 
in a small claims forum. In addition, large entities are most affected 
by a certain type of plaintiff who uses the costs of litigation (rather 
than the merits of the claim) as a false proxy of settlement value.20 
For instance, in the current system, a legitimate claim for $100,000 
might involve a conservative defense budget of $300,000, distorting 
the rational settlement value well above the value of the claimed 
damages. Such cases, though largely irrational for a plaintiff to file 
strictly on the merits, do exist; as noted, 341 out of 1206 patent cases 
in the latest survey period involve less than one million dollars at 
issue.21 If, on the other hand, the same defendant could defend that 
claim in a small claims setting, the rational settlement value would 
fall much closer to (and indeed below) the claimed damages. Thus, 
large entities would also benefit from a reduction in transaction cost 
distortions caused by the current system of expensive patent 
litigation. 
II. PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF PATENT SMALL 
CLAIMS COURTS 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several well-respected policy 
groups, including the ABA, voiced favor for a patent small claims 
procedure. Despite this, such proposals stalled. 
                                                          
19 AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 7, at I-90–91. 
20 See Bruce Hay & Kathryn Spier, Litigation and Settlement 23 
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion 
Paper No. 218, 1997), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/218.pdf 
(“Another common motivation [of policymakers] is to prevent litigants from 
compelling their adversaries to accept settlements that do not reflect the 
underlying merit of the claim—as when, for example, a plaintiff with a 
frivolous claim extracts a substantial sum from the defendant by 
threatening the defendant with costly litigation.”). 
21 AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 7, at I-90 to 91. Of 
course, such cases are not necessarily irrational as long as the plaintiff 
factors in an opponent’s propensity for early settlement. 
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A.  1990 ABA RESOLUTION 401.4 
 The ABA sponsored the most important prior work on patent 
small claims. In 1990 the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and 
Copyright Law (“ABA Section”) adopted Resolution 401.4 in support of 
a small claims patent procedure.  The text of the Resolution stated: 
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright 
Law favors, in principal, legislation for the establishment of an 
expedited, low-cost small claims procedure within the federal 
judiciary for the resolution of civil patent and copyright disputes 
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, having an amount in 
controversy less than an appropriate stated sum.22 
The ABA Section envisioned some of the details of its small 
claims procedure. The full text of those details follows here. It is 
notable that the ABA Section acknowledged prior statements in 
support of a small claims procedure, including that of AIPLA, which 
suggested an even greater threshold of “small” than the ABA (one 
million dollars instead of $100,000, in 1990 dollars): 
The proposed procedure would mandate that all disputes, 
involving exclusive federal jurisdiction subject matter having an 
amount in controversy less than $100,000 be resolved through 
this procedure. The procedure would be limited to disputes based 
upon exclusive federal jurisdiction. No pendant jurisdiction claim 
may be maintained. No counterclaim other than those which 
could have separately been brought using the federal small claims 
procedure may be maintained.  All other compulsory 
counterclaims are separate causes of action and must be brought 
in the normal course in the district court where it would have 
been brought. The federal small claims procedure would be 
initiated by either the plaintiff or the counterclaim defendant and 
would be removable to the federal district court by the defendant 
or the counterclaim defendant. 
A magistrate would preside and rule in all federal small claims 
procedure disputes. The plaintiff would not have a right to “trial 
by jury.” This could pose a constitutional problem in that, at first 
blush, it appears to violate the 6th [sic: presumably 7th] 
Amendment. However, the federal small claims procedure 
contemplates that a losing litigant may appeal the decision to the 
district court where the case would be tried “de novo.” This would 
overcome the constitutional objections. However, to thwart 
continuous appeals to the district court, thereby frustrating the 
purpose of the federal small claims procedure if the appellant 
loses on “appeal,” then the appellant would pay all costs, 
including attorneys’ fees to the appellee. This would be a 
                                                          
22 Federal Small Claims Procedure, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT L. COMM. REP. 194 (report of Ronald L. Yin, Chairman, 
Subcomm. B). 
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deterrent to all appellants in that only “meritorious appeals” will 
be maintained. 
Similarly, because this would be an expedited procedure, 
provisions should not be made for willful damages or for 
attorneys’ fees. Further, the plaintiff could not seek equitable 
remedies; the federal small claims procedure is only for damages. 
However, a prevailing litigant could use the judgment obtained in 
the federal small claims procedure as the basis for a motion to the 
district court judge for an entry of equitable remedies. The 
fairness or the thoroughness of the small claims proceedings 
could be examined by the district court judge in determining 
whether or not to issue equitable remedies. Since equitable relief 
considers all the circumstances, the fact that the judgment was 
obtained through the federal small claims procedure would be a 
factor to be considered by the federal district court. 
In addition, there should be some limitations on discovery and/or 
trial. Because the purpose of the federal small claims procedure is 
to resolve disputes in an expedited and inexpensive manner, 
discovery limitations and trial date limitations should be 
specifically set forth in the procedure. 
Finally and most importantly, although the resolution proposes a 
limitation of $100,000, the committee is not in unanimous 
agreement as to this amount. There is a lot of sentiment for 
increasing the amount. Clearly, with the passage of 28 U.S.C. 
1332 increasing the limit for diversity purposes from $10,000 to 
$50,000 indicating Congressional sentiment that the federal 
judiciary should not be the forum for diversity actions less than 
$50,000, $50,000 seems to be the smallest amount which should 
be considered as the ceiling for the small claims procedure. There 
are many members of the committee who have expressed the view 
that the amount should be between $100,000 and $500,000. In 
fact, the AIPLA has a proposal similar to the current proposal, 
suggesting a One Million Dollar ($1,000,000.00) limit for 
resolution of disputes of small claims.23 
The ABA Section knew it was not working in a vacuum. The 
detailed discussion of Resolution 401.4 states, “the AIPLA has a 
proposal similar to the current proposal . . . .”24 Indeed, in 
subcommittee discussions leading to the resolution, the 
subcommittee members noted other groups were very much in favor 
of a patent small claims procedure.25 
 During subcommittee discussion of the resolution, minutes show 
one member moved to amend the text to make explicit that the 
resolution suggested a “mandatory” procedure. In the process, he 
noted the enthusiastic support that already existed for such a 
                                                          
23 Id. at 195–96. 
24 Id. at 196. 
25 See Division IV—Related Legal Issues, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 82. 
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proposal: 
Mr. Dunner then moved to amend: “The amendment would be in 
line 2, to delete the word ‘an’ before ‘expedited’ and to insert in its 
place ‘a mandatory.’” The motion was duly seconded, and Mr. 
Dunner spoke on the motion: “I make this motion because I am 
convinced that that was the intent of the proposal, and, in fact, 
that is the intent of related proposals that have been floating 
around in the AIPLA and other groups, which have received a lot 
of support from a lot of leaders of the profession. 
There was a conference at the Franklin Pierce Law School in New 
Hampshire within the last year, and there were at least 20 or 30 
opinion leaders in the profession who are almost unanimous in 
their excitement about this kind of procedure. But their 
excitement was keyed to it being mandatory; but if it is voluntary, 
you have nothing more or less than you have today.”26 
 Resolution 401.4 did not catch on, nor did the other work by 
“AIPLA and other groups”27 and the 20 or 30 “leaders of the 
profession.”28 That is understandable, in light of (a) the fairly complex 
Seventh Amendment accommodations; (b) the use of magistrate 
judges nationwide; (c) removability to an ordinary court by a 
defendant. 
 First, under the procedure envisioned by the ABA Section, a 
plaintiff is restricted to a nonjury trial for the first adjudication of its 
claim. Since patent cases must be tried to a jury under the Seventh 
Amendment,29 the ABA Section proposes a constitutional cure for this 
facially defective approach: a de novo jury trial “appeal” for the loser. 
Plaintiffs would find this cure both unappealing and radical—
unappealing because the first non-jury adjudication would doubtless 
get some sort of deference and radical because no such “jury appeal” 
has existed before in the federal judiciary.  Nor is it clear that such a 
cure would pass the necessary test of constitutionality. 
 Second, proposing a single nationwide change to the court 
system, without proper testing, was likely too ambitious. Without a 
record of success in a limited environment, advocates of patent small 
claims courts would find it difficult to interest members of Congress 
in a major structural change benefiting a single species of federal 
litigant. In addition, the resolution presupposes that magistrate 
                                                          
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (holding that patent infringement actions descended from 
actions at law and, consequently, must be tried to a jury as required by 
the Seventh Amendment). 
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judges would support such an increase in their workload. Any 
concerted opposition by the nation’s magistrate judges might doom 
such an ambitious legislative proposal. 
 Third, removability would defeat the purpose of a “mandatory” 
small claims procedure. If a defendant removed a case, its 
commencement in small claims court would end up having been a 
wasted expense with nothing gained. Even a defendant who removed 
under pretext would gain a tactical advantage, for the threat and 
actuality of removal would incrementally increase the plaintiff’s costs. 
The perceived risk of magnified expense, whether it is the prospect of 
ending up in an ordinary court or the prospect of spending money to 
stay out, would deter the use of the small claims procedure. This 
would dilute any positive ex ante behavioral changes among patentees 
and accused infringers pre-suit that would otherwise increase the 
frequency of negotiated settlements. 
 The final section of this article contains a proposal that avoids all 
of these pitfalls of Resolution 401.4. 
B. 1992 PATENT REFORM COMMISSION APPROVAL 
 During the wave of patent reform proposals in the early 1990s, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce itself took action. In 1990 
Commerce formed the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform.30 
Among the many issues on which the Commission sought public 
comment was the possibility of a small claims court for patents. In a 
Federal Register notice, the Commission included the following topic 
in its request for comment: “Is there a need for a ‘small claims’ type of 
patent proceeding in the Federal courts . . . .”31 
 At least one of the Commission’s numerous members, Donald 
Dunner, was also a subcommittee member involved in drafting 
Resolution 401.4.32 In the Commission’s final report to the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Commission indicated, albeit in a faintly positive 
way, that the matter needed to be studied further: 
The Commission also recommends consideration and use of other 
                                                          
30 ADVISORY COMM’N ON PAT. LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY 
OF COMMERCE, at ii (1992) (letter from Commission chairman to 
Commerce Secretary). 
31 Request for Comments for the Advisory Commission on Patent Law 
Reform, 56 Fed. Reg. 22, 702, 22, 703 (May 16, 1991). 
32 See Division IV—Related Legal Issues, supra note 25; see also 
Biography of Donald R. Dunner (2005), http://taiwan-
ip.org/bios/DunnerDonaldBio.pdf (listing Mr. Dunner’s accomplishments, 
including terms of service as a member of the Secretary of Commerce’s 
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform and as an AIPLA President 
and member). 
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means of resolving patent disputes. For example, the Commission 
urges greater awareness and use of alternate dispute resolution to 
resolve patent disputes, as well as consideration of special 
procedures to conduct patent litigation. The Commission urges 
that three proposals be studied further, specifically, 
- designating specialized patent courts, 
- intra-circuit sharing of judges with experience in patent 
litigation, and 
- adoption of a “small claims” procedure for patent cases in 
Federal courts.33 
This is where the trail goes cold.34 There do not appear to be any 
actions in support of a small claims procedure for United States 
patent cases since 1992. Thus, despite support from the AIPLA, the 
ABA, numerous “opinion leaders,” plus “a lot of leaders of the 
profession,” and Commerce’s own Advisory Commission on Patent 
Law Reform, no parties thereafter have taken any serious steps to 
augment the U.S. court system with a small claims court for patent 
disputes. Additionally, apart from the shortcomings of some details 
within such proposals, which are eliminated by the new proposal set 
forth here, no one seems to have suggested any reason to abandon 
the general idea of a Patent Small Claims Court. 
 
III. THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT AS A POTENTIAL 
MODEL 
 While practitioners in the United States were merely talking 
about a small claims court, England and Wales were actually forming 
one. This established court supplies a comparative law example that 
can teach much about how to craft a successful small claims court for 
the United States. 
By way of background, ordinary patent cases in England are 
tried to a specialized court—the Patents Court. Presently, seven 
judges sit on the Patents Court, which is part of the High Court.35 
There are no jury trials.36 
                                                          
33 ADVISORY COMM’N ON PAT. LAW REFORM, supra note 30, at 13–14 
(1992). 
34 In an email to the author, Mr. Dunner reflected, “I don’t recall 
anybody picking up on it and doubt if anyone is considering it today.” E-
mail from Donald Dunner to author (Dec. 30, 2008) (on file with author). 
35 See THE PATENTS COURT GUIDE § 3 (2008), http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/cms/files/Patents_Court_Guide_as_revised_on_18_Novemb
er_2008.pdf (authorized by the Chancellor of the High Court, United 
Kingdom). 
36 John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a 
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 In the late 1980s a group of English practitioners suggested 
the creation of a Patents County Court (“PCC”) as an alternative to the 
High Court for patent litigation.37 Enabling legislation passed in 
1988, and the first (and only) PCC formed in London in 1990.38 One 
judge, Judge Michael Fysh, QC, sits on the PCC.39 
 As Judge Fysh has written, the purpose of the PCC is “to cater 
for the needs principally of medium and small size firms in litigating 
patents, registered designs and certain other cases involving similar 
rights.”40 Others have remarked that “[t]he intention was to provide a 
court which had procedures which were designed to reduce costs and 
increase the speed of patent litigation,”41 primarily for “private 
inventors or smaller companies.”42 
 As the PCC has evolved, it has kept its focus on small companies 
and fast cases more through court practice and custom than through 
rules or thresholds. The PCC and the Patents Court of the High Court 
do not have any formal jurisdictional division in relation to patent 
disputes.43 There is, rather, “an understanding that the ‘simpler’ 
cases will find their way to the PCC, but there is no formal threshold 
of value or complexity.”44 
 The only true difference between the PCC and the regular Patents 
Court is that patent agents (who are not necessarily qualified lawyers) 
can initiate and prosecute cases in the PCC.45  In addition, unlike in 
the High Court, patent agents, solicitors, and barristers all have the 
                                                                                                                            
Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
766, 774 (2000) (contrasting the Patents Court and the Patents County 
Court). 
37 Michael Burdon, UK Patents County Court—Phoenix Risen?, PATENT 
WORLD, July–Aug. 2003, at 19. The creation of a Patents County Court 
was suggested by the so-called Committee of Interested Parties in 
response to a 1986 white paper calling for all patent disputes to be 
handled by the Patent Office rather than by the courts. Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Michael Fysh, The Work of the Patents County Court, OXFORD 
INTELL. PROP. RES. CENTRE E-JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. RTS., 2003, at 1, 
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0303.pdf.  
41 United Kingdom—Revival of the Patents County Court, LADAS & 
PARRY MAY 2006 INFORMATION NEWSLETTER (Ladas & Parry LLP, New York, 
N.Y.), May 2006, 
http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2006/20060500/UKPatentCountyCo
urt.shtml. 
42 Id. 
43 Burdon, supra note 37, at 19. 
44 Id. 
45 Fysh, supra note 40, at 2. 
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right of “audience,” meaning the right to appear and advocate.46 
 Both the Patents Court and the PCC allow for parties to agree to, 
or for a judge to impose, a so-called “streamlined procedure.”47 In the 
default form of the streamlined procedure, all factual and expert 
evidence is in writing, there is no requirement to give document 
discovery, there are no experiments, cross-examination is only 
permitted on isolated topics, and the total trial duration is fixed 
(normally capped at one day) and takes place about six months after 
the order setting the streamlined procedure.48 The judge may depart 
from these default parameters, however.49 Legal advisors are under a 
duty to draw their clients’ attention to the availability of a streamlined 
procedure.50 
 The PCC seems to be garnering positive reviews from the English 
legal community. One reviewer reports that under its first judge, the 
“‘experiment’ seemed to have failed.”51 But now under Judge Fysh, 
the court is “back in business”52 and “showing excellent recovery and 
promise for the future.”53 In addition, the same reviewer suggests that 
rigorous application of the streamlined procedure might help the PCC 
differentiate itself from the Patents Court.54 
 The United States can import some lessons of the PCC, but 
there are limits due to institutional and legal differences. The English 
system lacks patent jury trials, whereas, in the United States, jury 
trials are constitutionally required for patent cases, unless waived.55 
In addition, the English have a long experience with a specialized 
patent trial court; the United States has no experience. Nevertheless, 
what successes there are seem auspicious for any small claims patent 
effort in the United States. The very existence of a sophisticated court 
system that, at least for bench trials, seems successful at cleaving 
small patent cases from large ones and ushering the small cases 
consistently toward resolution within six months shows that a Patent 
Small Claims Court is possible. One other lesson emerges—it is 
                                                          
46 Burdon, supra note 37, at 19. 
47 THE PATENTS COURT GUIDE § 10(d) (2003), http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/infoabout/patents/crt_guide.htm (authorized by the 
Chancellor of the High Court, United Kingdom). 
48 Id. § 10(a). 
49 Id. § 10(d). 
50 Id. § 10(e). 
51 Burdon, supra note 37, at 20. 
52 Id. at 19. 
53 Id. at 21. 
54 Id. at 19. 
55 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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important to staff such a court with a judge (or judges) dedicated to 
its mission and enthusiastic for its success. 
IV. A PROPOSED PATENT SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
SOLUTION 
 Proposals for other specialized patent trial courts have gone 
unheeded in the past. Perhaps they were too ambitious, seeking 
nationwide changes all at once.56 This new proposal carefully avoids 
that pitfall, as well as the pitfalls previously identified in the 1990 
ABA Section Resolution 401.4. A Patent Small Claims Court can be 
instituted locally in one district court on an experimental basis, using 
an existing Article III judge.57 Then, if that experience justifies 
nationwide expansion, Congress may step in to implement it. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION VIA LOCAL RULES ON A TRIAL BASIS 
 Patent reform does not necessarily require an act of Congress. 
There are already instances of patent reform that United States 
District Courts have implemented via local rule.  For example, the 
Northern District of California implemented its own Patent Rules, 
which govern the scheduling and exchange of contentions during 
patent litigation.58 The Northern District of California Patent Rules 
have been emulated by many district courts around the country. The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld challenged aspects of 
those Patent Rules as a valid exercise in local rulemaking in O2 Micro 
International Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.59 
In O2 Micro the Federal Circuit observed that to be valid, a local 
rule must be consistent with both acts of Congress and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.60 The court explained that a local rule 
inconsistent with the purposes of a federal rule is invalid.61 In O2 
                                                          
56 See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 36; John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. 
Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with 
that of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67 (1995). Mr. Pegram 
advocated initially in 1995, and later in 2000, that the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) become a specialized patent trial court for the entire 
United States for all patent cases, large and small. Pegram, supra note 36, 
at 782–83.  
57 Having an Article III judge, versus a magistrate judge, keeps the 
levels of potential appeal to a minimum. 
58 N.D. Cal. Patent R. 1-1 to 4-7 (2008). 
59 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 
1363–66 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
60 Id. at 1365 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) and FED. R. CIV. P. 
83(a)(1)). 
61 Id. 
GREENSPOON RP.  Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent Small Claims Court?  
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 549-566. 
562 MINN.J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
Micro a litigant challenged the aspect of the Northern District of 
California Patent Rules that required a party to supplement its 
contentions diligently upon learning new information revealing those 
contentions to be incomplete.62 After analyzing the purpose and spirit 
of the discovery regime codified by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court held, “we see nothing in the Federal Rules that is 
inconsistent with local rules requiring the early disclosure of 
infringement and invalidity contentions and requiring amendments to 
contentions to be filed with diligence.”63 The court cautioned, 
however, that “[i]f a local patent rule required the final identification 
of infringement and invalidity contentions to occur at the outset of the 
case, shortly after the pleadings were filed and well before the end of 
discovery, it might well conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
notice pleading and broad discovery regime created by the Federal 
Rules.”64 
Implementation via local rules carries a second distinct 
advantage beyond postponing the need for legislative approval. It 
allows a single district court to serve as an experimental or trial forum 
for a Patent Small Claims Court. This obviates one of the pitfalls that 
seems to have cursed prior proposals, namely, overambitious goals to 
bring change to the entire federal court system in one swoop. 65 
B. SUMMARY OF GOOD DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR A PATENT SMALL 
CLAIMS COURT 
Summarizing, any successful small claims court for patent 
disputes should incorporate the following elements: 
                                                          
62 Id. at 1363. 
63 Id. at 1366. 
64 Id. 
65 In an interview with the author, the Honorable Brian Barnett Duff 
suggested that the idea might achieve greater success if rolled out in three 
locations at once—e.g., a west coast court, an east coast court, and a 
midwest court. Interview with Hon. Brian Barnett Duff, Senior U.S. 
District Judge, retired (Jan. 13, 2009). A multi-court rollout has the 
added advantage of allowing each court to impose slightly different rules, 
even different thresholds of “small,” allowing subsequent evaluation of 
which rules work best. Judge Duff, who once sat by designation at the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which has exclusive jurisdiction 
over patent appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000)), also suggested that 
each local rules committee might be well served to seek the participation 
of a sitting Circuit Judge from the Federal Circuit. Interview with Hon. 
Brian Barnett Duff, supra. The participation of a Federal Circuit judge 
would lend such efforts added credibility, not to mention a useful appeals 
court perspective. 
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• the court should be good at what it does (i.e., prone to 
reach the right result) and have procedural rules to bring 
cases to resolution quickly; 
• the court must meet the constitutional requirements of 
the Seventh Amendment; 
• the court should be established at first via local court 
rules in one district, and those rules must be consistent 
with acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
• the court should be staffed by one or more judicial 
officers who will not feel overburdened by the role, and 
who will enthusiastically support its mission, and 
• the court should be mandatory once invoked by a 
litigant, with no right of removal. 
C. THE AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL OF A SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK 
 In light of the discussion above, I now set forth what I believe 
are basic parameters for a successful U.S. Patent Small Claims Court.  
These parameters should not be read as exhaustive, but rather as a 
starting point for any United States district court to begin drafting 
amendments to local rules. 
1. Thresholds 
A small claims court for patent disputes should be established, 
setting the definition of “small” at less than one million dollars in 
claimed damages. The threshold should serve as an initial claim, not 
as a binding judicial admission. In other words, a plaintiff’s initial 
pleading should be required to state on a sworn verification page that 
it believes its claim for damages by the time of trial will be less than 
one million dollars.66 If discovery reveals the claim is more valuable 
than that, so be it; the plaintiff may seek more than one million 
dollars. However, the rules should expressly provide that an opponent 
may use the sworn verification to cross examine the plaintiff or its 
experts who stray over the one million dollar line. As a result, 
plaintiffs will dread crossing that line, lest their financial witness gets 
impeached. These measures will separate the small cases from the 
large, while preserving a plaintiff’s right to use new information 
revealing that the infringement has caused more damage than 
                                                          
66 The discussion in this section assumes the patentee is the plaintiff, 
but mirror-image rules can be drafted that contemplate the same basic 
principals where an accused infringer is a plaintiff seeking a declaratory 
judgment. 
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previously thought. 
2. Jury Trials 
 The court should allow a jury trial to either party who requests 
it, as in the regular court system. This overcomes the defect in ABA 
Resolution 401.4 which eliminated a jury trial in the first instance. 
However, there is no reason to deny the inherent merit of speed and 
efficiency when matters are tried to the court. Those merits include 
the possibility of using procedures akin to the Patents Court and PCC 
streamlined procedures. Thus, this proposal provides incentives for 
litigants to waive a jury trial, as follows: 
 (a) If both parties waive a jury trial, the court will take all case-
in-chief evidence as written evidence, allowing live cross-examination 
during trial.  All issues may be presented (i.e., no issue will be 
bifurcated). 
 (b) If, however, the plaintiff demands a jury, it gets one. 
However, its case-in-chief will be limited to one full day of evidence, 
and the issue of damages will be bifurcated (to be tried to the same 
jury, but only after a liability verdict). While facially neutral, 
bifurcation of damages will be viewed negatively by most plaintiffs. 
 (c) Finally, if the plaintiff waives a jury but the defendant 
demands one, there will be a jury. Now, however, it is the defendant 
who suffers time limits and bifurcation. If the defendant’s demand 
necessitates a jury trial, the defendant will be limited to one full day 
of rebuttal evidence, and all affirmative defenses (including invalidity 
and unenforceability) will be bifurcated.67 
3. Contentions and Discovery 
 Some mechanism should exist to ferret out contentions and 
conclude document, written, and oral discovery quickly.  For example, 
every party who pleads a legal conclusion is automatically under an 
obligation, within thirty days, to report all known facts and legal 
theories supporting it (subject to supplementation). In effect, every 
legal claim set forth in a pleading automatically volunteers the 
                                                          
67 While it would be “patently unconstitutional” to impose “a penalty 
in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional 
right,” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968), the right to a 
jury trial is not “needlessly penalize[d]” under this scheme. It is allowable 
to condition electing a jury trial on the right to introduce “slightly different 
evidence” before a judge versus a jury, where the same remedies exist 
under either type of trial. Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439, 445–46 (9th Cir. 
1969), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 934 (1972). 
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claimant to respond to a contention interrogatory seeking a full 
explanation of the nature of that claim. In practice, a plaintiff who 
pleads that a specific product infringes must automatically disclose, 
within thirty days, the factual and legal basis for infringement. 
Likewise, a defendant who pleads an affirmative defense must make 
complementary automatic disclosures. An opponent receiving such 
contentions must then base its document collection and production 
on those contentions, regardless of whether individual requests have 
been served. Supplementation in light of an opponent’s document 
production will be allowed (preserving the validity of this framework 
under O2 Micro). Customized follow-up discovery requests will be 
allowed only after the first round of automatic disclosures and 
production. This customized discovery may be limited to, for example, 
ten document requests and three interrogatories. Finally, the default 
number of depositions should be reduced to four without leave of 
court. 
 Such automatic disclosures and exchanges should make it a 
simple matter to schedule a trial date within six to eight months after 
the filing of the complaint. 
4. The Judicial Officer 
 As the PCC experience shows, much of the success of a Patent 
Small Claims Court will depend on those who staff it. To guarantee 
the first judge’s enthusiasm for the project and competency over 
patent matters, the first district court to implement a Patent Small 
Claims Court should poll its senior judge ranks. Senior U.S. district 
judges have some discretion over their own caseloads. Better still, the 
U.S. taxpayers are already paying for their services. If one, or even 
two, senior district judges volunteer to substitute small claims patent 
cases for cases they would otherwise adjudicate, the program might 
begin with an experienced judiciary at the outset. There will be no 
need for additional court staff or legislative appropriations. It is even 
possible that the right judge who is already drawing a pension will 
come out of full retirement, minimizing taxpayer costs for maximum 
taxpayer return. 
Many federal judges actually like patent cases.68 A senior judge 
who enjoys presiding over patent cases might feel honored to become 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Hon. James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent 
Litigation Predicament in the United States (Mar. 26, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Univ. of Ill. Journal of Law, Tech. & Policy), 
available at http://www.jltp.uiuc.edu/works/Holderman.htm.  Judge 
Holderman writes, “As a United States District Court Judge, I enjoy patent 
cases.” Id.   
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the first judge to preside over the first specialized United States 
patent trial court in history (albeit one which takes only small cases). 
A federal judge who is enthusiastic for the project and focused on the 
task at hand is more likely to issue thoughtful, cost-sensitive, 
reversal-proof rulings. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 A federal Patent Small Claims Court, if properly designed and 
run, has every chance of being a positive development for all 
stakeholders in the U.S. patent system. As a side benefit, it might also 
reduce some of the burdens on a clogged regular court system. Prior 
proposals never achieved sufficient momentum, despite the opinion 
leaders who enthusiastically and unanimously backed the general 
concept. This article has identified and proposed cures for some of the 
problems that may have kept a small claims court for patent disputes 
from being implemented. 
